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CAPITAL TAXED AS INCOME*
BERT Louis KLOOSTER'
NVESTMENT surplus, which is part of the capital of
consolidated corporations, becomes taxable income
when a parent corporation sells the capital stock of its
subsidiary. At least, this is the conclusion of rather
recent tax decisions. That such capital may be taxed
as income is an idea which seems to have originated with
the Remington-Rand case, decided by a United States
Circuit Court of Appeals-a case we shall carefully
consider.
As this concept is an outgrowth of the contrary doc-
trine that certain income is capital and not subject to
income tax, the pendulum has thus swung to the other
extreme. The two extremes are yet so closely related
that as part of our thesis, the taxation of capital as
income, we shall first discuss the exemption of certain
income in the guise of capital.
TAX FREE STOCK MARKET GAINS
The administration of the income tax law has given
rise to the curious theory that a corporation can realize
neither a profit nor a loss when trading in its own cap-
ital stock.2 The United States Board of Tax Appeals
*Copyright 1931 by B. L. Klooster.
1 Associated with Cooke, Sullivan and Ricks, Corporation Lawyers;
also professor at the College.
2 Appeal of Simmons & Hammond Mfg. Co., 1 B. T. A. 803; United
Drug Co. v. Nichols, 21 Fed. (2d) 160 (U. S. District Court, Mass.).
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goes farther and holds that where a parent controls a
subsidiary company by ownership of the subsidiary's
capital stock, the purchase and sale by the subsidiary of
some of the capital stock of the parent does not result
in taxable gain to the consolidated companies.8  Again
the board holds that where a parent sells a subsidiary
company's stock to stockholders of the parent, affiliation
continuing, no taxable gain results.4.
The theory is reasoned thus: When a corporation sells
its own capital stock, the sum received is a contribution
of additional capital and therefore is not income. When
a corporation buys its own stock, there is a partial liqui-
dation and return to the stockholder of a portion of the
corporation's capital. So a purchase of 100 shares at 50
would be a liquidation to the extent of $5,000, and the
subsequent sale of the same 100 shares at 75 would be a
new capital contribution to the extent of $7,500. That
there has been a surplus increase of $2,500 is true, but
this is not income; the combined transactions have re-
sulted in a contribution of new capital and the resultant
surplus increase is therefore additional capital and not
income.
This is pretty reasoning, but it disregards the truth:
corporation profits always increase the investment or
surplus, just as do new capital contributions, but that
fact alone is insufficient to change real profits into tax-
free capital accretions. The mere fact of the increase in
invested capital would be evidence of a profit derived
from the transaction. In each particular case the facts
should govern. Ordinarily, a capital contribution or a
capital liquidation can easily be distinguished from the
process of having the corporation trade in its own stock.
The Board of Tax Appeals attempted to restrict the
rule to cases in which only cash was involved. Where
a corporation exchanged stocks and bonds of other cor-
porations plus $10,000 in cash as the purchase price of
3 Appeal of Farmers Deposit National Bank, 5 B. T. A. 520; Appeal
of John Scowcroft & Sons Co., 18 B. T. A. 532.
4 Appeal of Interurban Construction Co., 5 B. T. A. 529.
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its own stock, the board in 1928 held that the corpora-
tion sustained a loss which should be recognized for
income tax purposes. 5 Again in 1929 the board departed
from the rule and held that where a corporation sold
capital assets and as part of the selling price received
some of its own capital stock in exchange, the trans-
action resulted in gain or loss to be measured by the
market value of its own stock when received by the cor-
poration.6 These departures from the established rule
apparently were reasoned by only two members, one
for each decision. When, in December, 1930, the entire
board took part in a decision involving this point, the
majority of the members in a long opinion7 reaffirmed
the rule that a corporation realizes no gain or loss from
the purchase and sale of its own stock, and held that
the rule applied even where property is exchanged as
part of the consideration. The earlier, two decisions
were expressly overruled. It is significant, however, that
seven of the sixteen members of the board joined in a
dissenting opinion.
The chief evil of considering such transactions as not
resulting in income, is that stockholders may thereby
evade taxes in certain stock market transactions. If a
stockholder gained $10,000 by personally dealing in stock
of his own corporation, he would pay a normal tax not
exceeding 5 per cent under present laws-with surtax
added if he had other income. If, however, he gained
this sum through stock dealings carried on in the name
of his corporation, the gain would not be taxable to the
corporation, and by way of dividends the individual
would receive his $10,000 without being liable for a nor-
mal tax thereon.
It may be argued that when a corporation sells its own
stock the sum received in excess of par value becomes
capital surplus-as distinguished from ordinary sur-
5 Behlow Estate Co., 12 B. T. A. 1365.
6 New Jersey Porcelain Co., 15 B. T. A. 1059. See also United
States v. Cedarburg Milk Co., 288 Fed. 996.
7 Houston Brothers Co., 21 B. T. A. 804.
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plus-and is not available for dividends. Nevertheless,
such excess may go to stockholders as dividends, whether
or not it be considered as capital surplus. Most corpo-
rations do not declare dividends of all their profits but
permit substantial sums to remain for investment in
business expansion. Capital surplus, increased by stock
market trading gains, would provide for some of this
expansion and replace an equal amount of surplus arising
through business operations, thus liberating ordinary
surplus for dividends. For all practical purposes, there-
fore, a stockholder, by taking in his company's name
his stock market gains on his company's stock, and in-
creasing his dividends by such gains, ultimately puts
them into his own pocket free from the corporation
income tax of 12 per cent, free from the individual
normal tax of 5 per cent, and subject only to individual
surtaxes.
This plan appears to be particularly attractive where
the stockholders of a large corporation form a pool for
manipulating their own stock. If the individual stock-
holders are skillful they could arrange to take losses on
their personal returns, and gains tax-free on the corpo-
ration returns, altogether resulting in quite a handsome
tax saving.
This temptation should be removed. If the practice of
regarding the sale -by a corporation of its own stock as
occasioning neither gain nor loss, has been too long
indulged in for rectifying through administrative or judi-
cial channels, this sort of transaction should be distin-
guished by statute from those involving capital contri-
butions and liquidations. Borderline cases, concerning
which there may be honest doubt, could be covered by a
few proper regulations. Fraud penalties might be ap-
plied to evasions of this type. Where the facts indicate
that stockholders are dealing in the stock of a corpo-
ration under the pretense that it is dealing in its own
stock, gains should at least be taxed at the corporation
rate, now 12 per cent.
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INVESTMENT SURPLUS AS COST
The problem here discussed is best understood by an
illustration:
March 1, 1916, the Baker-Vawter Company (the
parent company) purchased all of the capital stock of
the Commercial Stationery and Loose Leaf Company
(the subsidiary company) for the sum of ........... $45,000.00
February 28, 1920, the parent sold the stock of the
subsidiary for ................................... 60,000.00
During the period of affiliation, March 1, 1916, to
February 28, 1920, the subsidiary had accumulated
profits which still remained in the business (herein
designated Investment Surplus) in the sum of ...... 28,454.35
The Commissioner of Internal Revenue claimed
that these transactions resulted in a profit of ....... 15,000.00
The taxpayer claimed a resultant loss of ........... 13,454.35
The Board -of Tax Appeals held the foregoing to be a
capital transaction resulting in neither a gain nor a loss;
being the sale by an affiliated group of its own capital
stock.8 Upon appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, that court in the case of Remington-
Rand, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,9 re-
versed the board and held that the transaction was not
a capital transaction but one which resulted in a profit
or a loss. The court then proceeded to compute the
resultant gain or loss, and found that the Commissioner's
contention was correct, and that the taxpayer had rea-
lized a gain of $15,000. If the investment surplus, that
is, the subsidiary's accumulated profits, in the sum of
$28,454.35 had been added to the cost of the stock, a loss
of $13,454.35, as contended by the taxpayer, would have
resulted. The surplus, or net worth, of the parent com-
pany was actually $13,454.35 less after the sale than it
was before. The reasoning of the court in refusing to
add investment surplus to cost is considered below.
s Baker-Vawter Co., 7 B. T. A. 594; Remington-Rand, Inc., 11 B. T. A.
773.
9 33 Fed. (2d) 77, certiorari denied.
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In a case where the subsidiary's stock was purchased
and sold at book value, and the book value at the time
of sale included profits accumulated during the period of
affiliation, the board in another case had held that the
transaction did not result in taxable income.10 Five
members of the board had dissented, but the decision was
affirmed by oral opinion of the United States Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit." The board
and court were apparently wrong in holding the trans-
action non-taxable, but right in the result, for in the view
here taken the computation when the sale was at book
value would have shown neither a gain nor a loss. This
case has been relied upon to support the proposition
that the Commissioner could not tax intercompany
profits, and so may be considered as approved by deci-
sions subsequent to the Remington-Rand case.12
The board followed the method of computation indi-
cated by the Remington-Rand case in later decisions.13
Although now holding that subsidiary gains previously
included in taxable consolidated income may not be added
to the cost of the subsidiary stock, the board also holds
that accumulated losses of the subsidiary availed of by
the parent in computing consolidated taxable income in
prior tax returns, may not be availed of a second time
when the parent sells the subsidiary stock, and therefore
such losses must be deducted from the cost before the
latter may be used as the basis for determining gain or
loss from the sale.14 In other words, subsidiary profits
must be taxed a second time, when the parent sells the
subsidiary stock, but the losses may not be deducted a
second time.
10 Appeal of H. S. Crocker Co., 5 B. T. A. 537.
11 Reported in Prentice-Hall 1930 Tax Service, Volume 1, page 1530.
12 Utica Knitting Company v. United States, 68 Court of Claims 77;
Riggs National Bank, 17 B. T. A. 615, appeal by Commissioner now
pending before the United States Circuit Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit.
13Obenchain-Boyer Co., 17 B. T. A. 293; Universal Corporation, 17
B. T. A. 319.
14 Riggs National Bank, 17 B. T. A. 615, appeal by Commissioner
now pending before the Circut Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit.
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In refusing to add investment surplus to cost, the court
in the Remington-Rand case reasoned as follows:
Concededly a gain of $15,000 was realized, unless the parent
company may take into account as additional cost of the stock
the subsidiary's accumulated earnings of $28,454.35. It is
argued that the parent company could have had its subsidiary
declare its net profits as dividends, without subjecting the
parent company to any tax, . and that it could then
have invested such dividends in the business of the subsidiary,
in which event they would be treated as an addition to the price
paid for the stock. In other words, we are urged to hold that
the accumulation of earnings by the subsidiary was a construc-
tive receipt of dividends and reinvestment of them by the
parent company. But the same argument could be made with
equal force in respect to an individual or corporate owner of
stock sufficient in amount to control the board of directors of
the subsidiary, yet insufficient to result in affiliation. Tax lia-
bilities must be determined by what in fact was done.
The fact is that no declaration of dividends and no reinvestment
of them has occurred in either case, and it would seem unreason-
able to accept the theory of constructive receipt and investment
in the one case, but not in the other. Where affiliation is absent,
no one doubts that the theory would be rejected; to accept it
would contradict the theory of Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U. S.
189.
Again, it is urged that a failure to treat the accumulated
earnings as an addition to the cost of the stock will produce
the inequitable result of double taxation, because the earnings
have already been taxed as income of the affiliated group. But
double taxation of this character will exist, though there be
no affiliation between the owner of the stock and the corpora-
tion which issued it, and is, as pointed out in Heflmich v. Hell-
man, 276 U. S. 233, 237, the ordinary incident of a profitable
sale of stock. We hold, therefore, that the sale resulted in
taxable gain of $15,000.
It might be argued that the matter of computing the
profits was not properly before the court. The Board
of Tax Appeals having decided that the transaction was
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a capital transaction not resulting in gain or loss, it was
only necessary for the court to reverse this decision
whereupon the case might have been remanded to permit
the board first to make the computation. Instead, the
court made the computation. Under the circumstances,
the court decided this question for the first time and it
was not heard on appeal.
There was at least a doubt as to whether the accumu-
lated earnings of the subsidiary were capital or income, 15
and in taxation doubts are construed in favor of the tax-
payer, for the real burden of proof rests not on the
taxpayer but on the government. 16 The court reasoned
that "concededly" accumulated profits were not part
of the cost, if the taxpayer's theories that they were
cost, failed. Both of the taxpayer's theories failed, and
consequently accumulated profits were not permitted to
be taken as cost. Therefore, the burden of proof was in
this manner erroneously placed on the taxpayer.
Assuming, however, that the burden of proof was
properly placed on the taxpayer, it appears that the
taxpayer might have succeeded by a third theory, or in
reality the first theory changed to remove its objections.
The first theory relied on was that the parent company
had constructively received such accumulated profits as
dividends which it had reinvested in the subsidiary and
15 Radin v. Commissioner, 33 Fed. (2d) 39, C. C. A. 3, 1929, in which
the court considered the question as to whether a sale of an interest
in real estate was personal estate or real estate, and said: "The
Board of Tax Appeals, being uncertain which it was, negatively up-
held the Commissioner on a statement that it was 'unable from the
evidence to hold that the Commissioner erred in taxing the profit.'
But the Commissioner, although he had before him only the evidence
that was before the Board, was required to know which it was in
order to determine a valid tax. Whether it was personal estate or
real estate cannot be left to surmise."
16Edson v. Lucas, 40 Fed. (2d) 398, 400, C. C. A. 8, 1930, in which
the court stated: "In Hellmich v. Hellman, 18 Fed. (2d) 239, 243, this
court said: 'It is both the English and the American rule that doubts
in taxation statutes are resolved in favor of the taxpayer, and that
laws Imposing taxes are to be strictly construed and not extended
beyond the clear import of the language used. It is the duty of taxing
powers to make clear what Is to be taxed and how.' See also, United
States v. Merriam, 263 U. S. 179, 188; Crocker v. Malley, 249 U. S.
223, 233; Rodenbough v. United States, 25 Fed. (2d) 13, 15; Eaton v.
English & Mersick Co., 7 Fed. (2d) 54, 57."
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such constructive dividends were just as much cost as
original investment. With regard to this, the court said
that dividends were not in fact declared and that tax
liabilities must be determined by what in fact was done.
The second theory relied on was that double taxation
resulted from failing to consider accumulated earnings
as part of the cost "because the earnings have been
taxed as income of the affiliated group." To upset this,
the court pointed out that "double taxation of this char-
acter will exist though there be no affiliation between the
owner of the stock and the corporation which issued it,
and is . . the ordinary incident of a profitable sale
of stock," and cited Hellmich v. Hellman.1 7 In that case
the United States Supreme Court held that corporation
gains accumulated after March 1, 1913, when distributed
in liquidation of a corporation, were not exempt from
the normal individual tax as dividends, but were sub-
ject to both individual normal tax and surtax, even
though the imposition of such normal tax resulted in
double taxation; for the reason that "when, as here,
Congress has clearly expressed its intention, the statute
must be sustained even though double taxation results."
In the Remington-Rand case the court showed no such
clearly expressed intention in the statute.
The theory which the court apparently did not con-
sider was that the profits gained by the subsidiary dur-
ing the period of affiliation, had already passed into the
surplus account and so had become part of the invested
capital of the parent and the consolidated group. The
court held that the entire proposition of constructive
receipt of dividends and their reinvestment fell by the
showing that there could be no constructive receipt of
dividends. The court apparently did not consider the
question of reinvestment as a fact solely by itself. Yet
in a normal situation profits become capital when a cor-
poration does not remove them from the business as divi-
dends. Remaining in the business, such accumulated
profits are called surplus and as a matter of fact are
17 276 U. S. 233.
CHICAGO-KENT REVIEW
invested in productive assets and working capital, the
same as the original capital. This process of reinvest-
ment is common knowledge and would seem to require
no proof. By becoming surplus and invested capital of
one member of the group, they automatically became
surplus and invested capital of the group.
The court failed to consider the effect of the trans-
action upon invested capital although in previous deci-
sions the same court had held that in consolidations the
separate members are considered as a unit, and their
"income and invested capital are really the income and
invested capital of a single enterprise.' i8  The under-
lying principle in permitting consolidated returns, is that
affiliated corporations in reality operate as an economic
unit and must be taxed as such. Only in this way can
tax evasion be prevented and the entire group be taxed
fairly from the standpoint of losses by some of the affili-
ated companies and gains by others. It is a mistake to
consider the group for tax purposes in one instance as
a unit and in another as separate corporations. The
existence of the affiliated group continued as a unit after
one subsidiary was dropped. If there were only a single
subsidiary, the sale of its stock had no effect on the
continued existence of the parent, and the parent, as the
head of the two affiliated corporations had already added
the subsidiary's profits to its own surplus and invested
capital for tax purposes, and such profits were actually
capital before affiliation ceased. The reasoning is the
same whether or not the parent follows the practice of
reflecting on its own balance sheet the accumulated
profits of the subsidiary in an asset account designated
"Investment Surplus," with the offsetting credit to its
own surplus account; for the reason that the subsidi-
ary's accumulated profits have already become capital
regardless of bookkeeping entries.At the instant the subsidiary's stock is sold, affiliation
between parent and subsidiary ceases. Nevertheless, the
same surplus is possessed by the parent both before
18ice Service Co. v. Commissioner, 30 Fed. (2d) 230, 231; Commis-
sioner v. Adolph Hirsch & Co., 30 Fed. (2d) 645, 646.
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and after the sale. On the asset side of the balance sheet,
the subsidiary's stock and investment surplus are re-
placed by cash. When stock and investment surplus
together equal the cash received, there is no change in
consolidated invested capital and no gain or loss from
the sale. If the cash received is more than the subsidi-
ary 's stock and investment surplus together, consolidated
surplus is increased by the excess of cash and there is
a gain to the extent of such excess. Likewise, if cash
received is less in amount than the asset accounts reflect-
ing the investment in the subsidiary, the consolidated
capital is decreased correspondingly and there is a loss
pro tanto. In other words, the gain or loss is measured
by the resultant increase or decrease in consolidated in-
vested capital.
Although sound on the proposition that the transaction
resulted in a realization of gain or loss, the Remington-
Rand decision erroneously computed the gain or loss by
reasoning that consolidated capital was income. Now,
by reason of extremely wide powers bestowed upon him
by the present Revenue Act, the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue has promulgated regulations which en-
force the rule of computation laid down in the Reming-
ton-Rand case, together with certain exceptions. In fact,
the exceptions by correcting the application of the rule
in some situations, further indicate that the rule itself
is unsound. But for 1929 and any years thereafter, a
corporation may not contest the validity of an income
tax imposed on investment surplus, for the reason that
the regulations permit the filing of a consolidated return
only on condition that the several affiliated corporations
consent to all the regulations, "and the making of a con-
solidated return shall be considered as such consent.' 19
Regardless of whether such regulations are valid, there
is need of a revised statute to require observance of the
effect of a given transaction on consolidated capital-
thus to eliminate much highly involved and doubtful
reasoning.
19 Section 141 of Regulations 75.
